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Power Cycle Theory Reconsidered
Is China going to destabilize the Global Order?
Sarah Hülser
Abstract
Based on the power cycle theory this paper assesses the theory’s explanatory power for 
China’s international rise, shifts in international power relations as well as the stabil-
ity of the international system. First, the paper explores whether Lahneman’s finding 
from 2003 of a “metastable” world is still valid today and which role China plays for this 
stability. Secondly, the paper discusses recent extensions to power cycle theory. Based 
on this discussion, the paper argues that these extensions do not properly account for 
the interaction of domestic and foreign policy but that a supra-national as well as a 
sub-national level of analysis should be incorporated into power cycle theory. Although 
all global actors must accommodate to new power relations, the world no longer ap-
pears “metastable” or destabilized by China’s rise when these new power determinants 
are included in the assessment.
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1. Introduction
The rise of China1 in the economic sphere and increasingly also in political institutions 
has fueled discussions in the West and among China’s neighbors about where China 
might be heading. In general, there seems to be consent among Western as well as 
Chinese academics that the world order has moved from bi- to multipolarity. Especially 
in the 21st century, this development can be seen in the context of a power shift from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific, from west to east and from industrialized countries to emerging 
markets. The questions which approach China will take towards international institutions, 
which goals it will pursue and which stand it will take towards cross-border issues and 
international threats are all closely intertwined. Underlying all these questions is the 
notion of power. China’s rise originally began with an increase in economic power and 
now step by step expands into political spheres. The demand for more participation in 
international institutions such as the IMF is only one example for this tendency2. Thus, 
the question arises which state holds how much power in which sphere because only 
with sufficient power a state will be able to pursue its interest.
The power cycle theory (PCT) by Doran3 is often drawn upon to predict the future 
development of the international power distribution as it proves well to explain power 
trajectories observed in the past two centuries. ‘Power cycle’ in this context means the 
“cycle of power and foreign policy role”4. The theory especially focuses on explaining 
the outbreak of war as it identifies war as the result of changed threat perceptions5. 
According to Lahneman, the world in 2003 was only “metastable” from the American 
point of view, because China could potentially realign its actual power and its attributed 
role on the international stage and thereby challenge the US hegemonic position6. 
Kissane7 has broadened this original concept to account for modern economies and 
has reassessed China’s future development. Based on this ‘new’ power cycle theory, he 
predicts that China will overtake the US in 2014. In contrast, Doran himself analyzed 
China’s ascendance under the auspices of the PCT and predicted that even though there 
will be important changes in the distribution of power among the major international 
players, there will not be an immediate risk of war or open confrontation between China 
and the US because China still benefits from the US-led international system. Thus, 
1  China is used as equivalent for the PRC.
2  Singh (2012, March 29th).
3  Doran (2000).
4  Doran (2000).
5  See Section 2 for a detailed explanation of the connection between war and changing power structures.
6  Lahneman (2003).
7  Kissane (2005a).
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according to Doran the international system is stable for the time being. Central to 
and uncontested by all these positions is the notion that China has increasingly more 
influence in international affairs. However, the question arises where these different 
assessments of future developments stem from and which role the PCT plays in 
predicting China’s future path.
The study at hand will take the original PCT and its components of power suggested by 
Lahneman as starting point to analyze China’s current and possible future position in 
the international system. Lahneman’s findings from 2003 will be reconsidered for their 
validity today; subsequently PCT-extensions by Kissane as well as new aspects brought up 
by Doran provide the input as to how the original PCT can be adjusted to analyze modern 
power distribution. However, these extensions do not, in my view, reach far enough to 
account for the elements influencing a nation’s power. Especially two features of the 
modern, globalized international community will be at the center of the discussion: First, 
the interaction of internal factors and foreign policy determinants and second the role 
of global issues such as environmental protection, energy supply or terrorism. So far, 
foreign policy has been considered detached from domestic circumstances and policies 
in the framework of PCT. This paper, however, argues that these two domains of policy 
making are closely intertwined and that therefore, foreign policy, a nation’s own power 
perception as well as its power exertion can only be analyzed when domestic factors are 
taken into account as well. With this argument, the paper at hand takes the PCT one 
step above and one below the original analysis level by arguing that sub-national as well 
as supra-national factors may significantly influence power. Assessing future prospects 
for China’s development while taking into account internal factors may yield different 
predictions about its future power trajectory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the original power 
cycle theory and its four central pillars -- namely a nation’s ascribed role, its declaratory 
role, its operations power and its structural power -- as well as its implications for role-
power misalignments. Section 3 presents a reassessment of Lahneman’s findings for 
today. Section 4 presents and discusses extensions to the original PCT brought forward 
by Kissane and Doran. Section 5 discusses the importance of domestic issues for a 
nation’s international policy role as well as the role international issues play in shaping 
international power distribution as further extensions to the PCT. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Power Cycle Theory (PCT)
The Power Cycle Theory states that “a principle cause of major war lies in the dynamic of 
state capability and role”8. As this statement already shows, the original PCT is concerned 
with nation states as main actors on the international stage. Each state has a share of 
the total power in the system and any increase in power in one state will, as in any 
zero-sum game, necessarily lead to a decrease in another state’s power. This hints at 
the second feature already: The PCT aims at explaining foreign and not domestic policy. 
More specifically, it aims at explaining a state’s foreign policy and power position in 
relation to other nations. Thus, power is measured in relative not in absolute terms. 
In the framework of the PCT, power is considered to have four dimensions namely its 
ascribed role, its declaratory role, its operational power and its structural power9. Each 
dimension is calculated as global share for each state. Total power is then obtained 
as equally weighted average of these factors. Over time, a power cycle curve plots a 
nation’s power trajectory and allows predictions about its future development. PCT has 
particularly often been used to analyze the incidence of war. Along the power trajectory, 
a state passes through various critical points. These are the peak and trough of the cycle, 
but also the inflection points where relative power growth or decline slow down. It is at 
these points that states feel most insecure and thus are most likely to wage war because 
a country that conceives others as increasingly dangerous to its own interests, security 
and position in the international system is more likely to wage war to defend its position 
and interests10. Thus, changes in power structure - or its perception - are closely linked 
to the occurrence of war. However, war is not the necessary result. The collapse of the 
former Soviet Union is the best example11. Chui argues, that passage of critical points 
much rather increases the probability of alliances among nations as they feel the need 
to stabilize the international environment12. This result, he suggests might be due to the 
fact that the decision to join an alliance may be much easier to reach than the decision 
to engage in war. With his results Chui also supports PCT as the passage through critical 
points increases the need for security and stability which in turn indicates that these 
phases are associated with higher instability and security threats. In the following each 
of the power determinants as applied by Lahneman will be presented.
8  Doran (1971).
9  Lahneman (2003).
10  Tessman (2004).
11  Doran (2012).
12  Chui (2003).
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2.1 The Ascribed Role
The ascribed power indicates a nation’s reputation and other nation’s perceptions of 
this state as well as of its behavior. This also includes, for example, whether this state’s 
prestige and council are valued internationally. However, an ascribed role can only 
evolve, when other states can observe a state’s actions and accept its ascribed role. If the 
US had not been accepted as world leader after World War II, this role would not have 
been ascribed to it. In order to incorporate the ascribed role into the model, Lahneman 
reviewed FBIS13 documents with regard to how frequent the word “foreign policy” was 
used and how often any term concerning the US was mentioned.14
2.2 Declaratory Role
In contrast, to the ascribed role, the declaratory role describes how a state wants to 
be seen by others and which role it sees for itself in the international environment. 
However, according to Lahneman the declaratory role is also reactive in the sense that it 
is mainly set by, for example, a state’s first reaction to changes in the roles of other actors. 
Thus, the declaratory role becomes apparent via the state’s focus of foreign policy and 
its declared goals. The more coherent this self-drawn picture is the easier it becomes for 
other nations to predict the state’s behavior and decision in international affairs. In his 
study, Lahneman reviewed speeches, addresses and press releases of the US government 
in order to detect whether partnership or leadership was emphasized more and how this 
emphasis evolved over time.
2.3 Operational Power
As the declaratory role - and the ascribed role -- are ideational, whether it is credible 
depends on the hard power of a state and thus on whether or not a state can actually 
implement its pursuits and its foreign policy. Thus, operational power determines 
whether and if yes, to which degree, a country can influence international decisions. 
This power concept includes military power, a state’s geography, the skill of its diplomats 
and the ability of intelligence services to correctly evaluate other nation’s capabilities 
and intentions. As military power is the most expensive foreign policy tool, it can be 
considered the most important one for operational power. Therefore, Lahneman uses 
military spending to proxy a country’s operational power and finds for the US that it 
increased since the end of the cold war but has decreased relative to the operational 
13  The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). In 2005 it was incorporated into the Open Source Center and   
it observes and translates foreign media news.
14  Lahneman (2003).
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power of its allies as they increased their military spending and thus their military 
capabilities.
2.4 Structural Power
Structural power determines a country’s economic capacity which is the foundation for 
any form of power display. Also, a country’s long-term growth prospects play an important 
role for its structural power because if a country was following an unsustainable growth 
path, its economic strength would sooner or later collapse. According to Lahneman, 
aligning a state’s role concepts with its structural power implies that resources are 
allocated optimally to domestic and foreign policy goals. In order to measure structural 
power, Lahneman uses nominal exchange rate-based as well as purchasing power parity 
adjusted GDP as the latter takes better into account a country’s productivity and its 
people’s actual wealth. 
While the first two elements are ideational and can be attributed to constructivism, the 
last two elements are rather realist in the sense that they mirror hard power concepts. 
In this regard, PCT combines elements from two main schools of thought in political 
science. If, according to these four elements, a state’s role and its power are aligned, 
it presents a credible, coherent foreign policy towards other international players and 
on the international stage it indicates a dynamic equilibrium as states neither over- or 
underestimate their own roles or power nor are they being over- or underestimated15. 
Thereby, international stability is enhanced as other nations may fairly well predict a 
state’s behavior or decisions. However, if a state’s role and its power are not in equilibrium, 
there exists a misalignment or a gap. The following discussion will focus on the situation 
in which states with increasing power have too little of an ascribed role. This is the 
situation Lahneman attests to China. He considers this situation “metastable” because 
China already has the structural and operational power necessary to credibly demand 
a stronger declaratory role. In doing that, however, China will automatically challenge 
other states’ power and mainly the leading position of the US.
3. Reassessment of Lahneman’s Findings for China Today
With regard to China’s ascribed role, one could argue that China is ascribed an 
increasingly important role in international politics. Examples for these demands is the 
North Korean peninsula where China was asked to act as kind of spokesman which the 
international community perceived to be heard by the North Korean regime16. Since 
15  Doran (2000).
16  See Nanto (2010) and Bajoria (2010).
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China provides North Korea with food, oil and arms, it has fairly strong leverage over the 
North Korean government. As much as these shipments may contribute to maintain the 
current dictatorship in North Korea, it also enables China to threaten the North Korean 
system by stopping its support. In the case of Myanmar, China has been asked by ASEAN17 
countries to enhance reform in Myanmar prior to the 2010 elections18. Due to their 
close economic ties, China was perceived to have more leverage in Myanmar than other 
international actors. Also, as global economic and financial imbalances prevail, China is 
called upon to bear part of the adjustment burden. The most prominent example is the 
frequent demand for China to appreciate its (allegedly) undervalued currency19. These 
examples are certainly not comprehensive but representative as they show that China is 
increasingly engaged in international issues and considered an important global player 
by other nations. China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council is only further proof 
of its importance. Hence, in terms of power elements, China has a more important and 
continuously growing ascribed role.
As for the declaratory role, the phrase coming to one’s mind immediately is China’s 
continuous declaration of its “peaceful rise”. Thereby, China wants to eradicate fears of 
neighbors and the international community at large that it might aim at geographical 
expansion, might pursue its interests with force if necessary and that it will respect 
other state’s sovereignty20. With this aim, China claims a rather defensive and modest 
role in foreign politics as it seems to be mainly focused on its internal development. 
When looking at statements by Chinese government officials, spokesmen with regard 
to international affairs, China continues this rather humble approach. For example, in 
the case of Syria, it justified its veto among other reasons because the “Syrian question 
should be resolved by the Syrian people”21. This statement can be interpreted as result of 
the Chinese non-intervention policy. However, a stable and secure global environment 
is of vital interest for China to pursue its developmental goals. Thus, according to its 
accounts, China stands ready to support peace missions in the Arab world and elsewhere. 
It supports, for example, the peace plan put forward by Kofi Annan for Syria but refrains 
from military interventions. Hence, one can draw the conclusion that China on the one 
hand is ascribed an increasingly important role by other states but that it does not claim 
that role for itself (yet). Hence, in terms of PCT, there exists a role-role misalignment. 
In contrast to this modest picture from the analysis of role, China’s operational power 
17  Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
18  Budianto (2009).
19  Chan (2010).
20  Zheng (2005).
21  Bradsher (2012), also the following.
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seems to have increased immensely over the past years as total military spending rose 
sharply (see figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 (China’s Military Spending in $US 
(mil))
FIGURE 2 (China’s Military Spending as 
% of GDP)
This increase has caused the international community to carefully eye Chinese military 
activities and has triggered many discussions about possible use of this newly created 
military power. Especially strategically important improvements such as the submarine 
program and new air crafts have drawn much attention and indicate that China is 
closing the military technology gap to Western powers22. In the framework of the PCT, 
this increased military spending indicates a stronger operational power. This can be 
interpreted as being in line with the previous finding of a larger ascribed role as other 
states respond to the growing operational power by ascribing China a larger foreign 
policy role. However, if considered relative to GDP, military spending is in line with its 
historical mean (see figure 2) and when comparing China’s military spending with that 
of other major military powers, it does neither seem frightening in total nor in relative 
terms (see figure 3 and figure 4).
22  International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011).
FIGURE 3 (Total Military Spending in $US 
(mil)) 
FIGURE 4 (Military Spending as % of GDP)
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Contrary to the absolute results, this relative spending rather complies with China’s 
moderate declaratory role and suggests that China may increase its military spending 
but that therein it stays within the range of other military powers and in good company 
with other major Asian powers such as Korea. Even though military spending increases 
in absolute terms, one could argue that other players in the power system do not need 
to feel threatened because GDP and military spending grow with approximately the 
same rate. However, the disputes in the South China Sea and the ongoing struggles 
with India and Pakistan prove that especially Asian nations do feel threatened by China’s 
military rise. Even though the US is involved in the disputes in South East Asia, they are 
not directly affected in geographical terms. The American feel of unease about China’s 
rise must thus stem mainly from other sources -- the economic rise. This leads to 
Lahneman’s fourth indicator: structural power. 
In terms of structural power, recent numbers of China’s GDP show that in nominal as well 
as in purchasing-power adjusted terms China has realized considerable achievements 
since its reform and opening at the end of the 1970s (see figure 5 and figure 6). 
However, in comparison with other countries, the result is similar to that from military 
spending because China still has to go a considerably long way until it reaches the 
level of the US. Figure 7 shows that particularly in terms of per capita GDP, China still 
ranks far below other industrialized countries such as the US, Germany or Japan. When 
adjusting GDP for purchasing power, China actually ranks second only to the US and the 
measure is increasing (see figure 8).
FIGURE 5 (China’s nominal GDP) FIGURE 6 (China’s PPP-adjusted GDP)
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This could be interpreted as “threat” to the American position as world’s richest economy. 
For the analysis of power cycles, however, GDP can only be a proxy for economic 
performance, especially since the financial sector becomes more and more important 
for the international position of an economy. Taking the results from these four power 
elements together, one can conclude that China does not seem to be on the brink of 
taking over global leadership but that it certainly has to be considered rising. Hence, 
Lahneman’s assessment of a “metastable” global situation does only seem to hold in the 
sense that China is catching up, but not in the sense that global leadership in economic 
and military terms is about to be taken over by China in the near future. Lahneman 
argues that China could and would threaten the American position as soon as it would 
declare itself a larger foreign policy role. The numbers above, however, do not support 
this view as only in the case of PPP-adjusted GDP does China seem to come close to the 
US position. As Doran indicates, China will in the course of its rise face limitations of the 
power system which will slow its relative power growth23. That will be the point when it 
will show whether the “metastability” detected by Lahneman might actually be stable. As 
China’s rise is considered to go along with a declining international position of the US, 
two major players will pass through critical points simultaneously. But as China’s main 
‘opponent’ in terms of relative power is not the US but rather other rising states such as 
India, possible conflict escalations are more likely to be expected among rising states 
and not between China and the US24. The following will, starting from the broadened 
concept of PCT, discuss prospects of such conflict escalation.
23  Doran (2012).
24  Doran (2012).
FIGURE 7 (GDP per capita in current 
international $)
FIGURE 8 (PPP-adjusted GDP in current 
international $)
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4. Extensions to the original PCT
Kissane broadened this original PCT in several respects. From the technical point of 
view, he measures the power indicators on a yearly basis instead of only every five years 
in order to accurately mirror global developments. More importantly, he introduces 
“globally significant non-state actors, such as the European Union” as actors in the power 
system and balances military and economic capability measurements25.
Including the EU as an important player has gained importance over the past decade and 
will, given that the European states manage to solve the current Euro crisis, also play a key 
role in the future for several reasons. Exposure and interdependence between Asia and 
Europe have intensified over the past years. Firstly, while China is one of Europe’s largest 
trading partners, East Asia in general receives much foreign direct investment from the 
EU26. Hence, any economic turbulence in Asia will have direct socio-economic welfare 
effects on Europe and vice versa. The fact that China is actively engaged in stabilizing 
the Eurozone by buying up Greek government bonds and investing in the Eurozone27 
shows that the stability of Europe must be of crucial interest for China in order to 
prevent its exports markets from collapsing. Even though critics might argue that China 
reorganizes its economic structure, tries to boost domestic demand and to thereby 
reduce export dependency, this process takes a long time and even once it is completed, 
China will still depend on export markets for its products. Feng emphasizes that China, 
despite its growing technological capabilities, is still dependent on European money 
and technological transfer28. Casarini also argues that resolving global challenges such 
as the Sino-American trade imbalance will not be possible without the EU29. Therefore, 
when analyzing China’s future role in global politics it seems very reasonable to include 
all of its major trading partners as actors in the PCT.
Secondly, the EU and China have already established cooperation in various fields such 
as illegal migration as well as annual summits since 1998.30 There certainly is broad 
scope for future cooperation in new fields such as the future global monetary order and 
the revaluation of the Chinese Yuan because, despite its current challenges and doomed 
outlook, the EU has achieved unprecedented regional integration and therefore may 
assist other regions in integration negotiations. From the Chinese side, there is a strong 
interest in a stable international environment in order to maintain its economic growth; 
25  Kissane (2005a).
26  Casarini (2011a).
27  Casarini (2011b).
28  Feng (2008).
29  Casarini (2011).
30  Godement (2008).
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hence China backs the European calls for reform of the international financial system 
that have arisen since the global financial crisis31. Godement suggests that fields as 
proliferation, development aid to Africa or the effectiveness of UN resolutions may 
provide further cooperation opportunities32. Especially in the light of China’s interest 
to balance US influence it may consider the EU an even more important partner and 
enhance their strategic partnership. While the first argument in favor of increasing 
importance of the EU was based on economic ties, this second argument rather has 
its origins in the political realm. Including non-state actors accounts for the fact that 
especially in the past three decades many regional organizations have been established 
that are increasingly perceived as important global actors.
Kissane’s second innovation to PCT was to balance military and economic power 
elements. As especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union military power decreased 
while economic power gained importance, weighing these two parts equally seems 
only reasonable. Hence, Kissane includes military expenditure, military personnel and 
military expenditure per soldier for the military capability and iron and steel production, 
energy consumption and urban population as percentage of the total population as 
proxies for the economic capability33.
With these adjustments to the original PCT, Kissane predicts China’s power to be on par 
with the US in 201434 and that China will overtake the US as predominant international 
actor in 201535. As his approach balances military and economic power, he states, “it 
may not even be possible to claim that US military dominance will continue”. When 
translating this assessment back into Lahneman’s categories, it implies that China has 
the operational and structural power to take on a more important foreign policy role. 
Also, it implies that China demands this new role and thereby aligns its declaratory role 
with its structural and operational power. Eventually, this will lead to a change in China’s 
ascribed role as the other nations will realize and accept - according to Kissane they do 
not have any other choice - China’s new foreign policy role. Such a structural change, 
however, can only take place if the other states accept and adjust to the new power 
distribution and whether the currently most powerful states, i.e. the US, will consent 
to diminishing their power uncontested is more than doubtful. Thus, as is predicted 
by PCT, China as well as the US and other major powers will face critical points in their 
power trajectory. Such a scenario carries a higher probability for the outbreak of war 
31  Noesselt (2012).
32  Godement (2008).
33  Kissane (2005).
34  Kissane (2008a).
35  Kissane (2005a).
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than normal times do. Hence, if one follows Kissane’s prediction, a war between China 
and the US may be likely.
In his most recent analysis of China Doran, however, predicts that just that will not 
happen in the near future36. Boundaries of the power system, he argues, will force 
China to have a much slower relative power growth in the upcoming years which will be 
due to the fact that no state is immune against structural change of the power system. 
Historically, all rising states have faced the inflection point when their relative power 
growth begins to slow down. Therefore, China will not continue to realize the power 
growth from the past decades37. His second argument that the increasing power of a 
rising state has to be acknowledged by other states to actually change the existing power 
distribution is in line with PCT as it implies that the declaratory and the ascribed role of 
a state are aligned.
One very important change in the newer approaches to China with the PCT is to include 
India among the major global powers38. Looking back, Kumar notes that China’s rise in 
relative power in the 1960s was only possible at the expense of India39. With regard to 
the future, Doran argues that the power struggle of these two nations will shape future 
world politics as they may increasingly challenge each other’s power. China’s support 
of Pakistan is the most prominent example. The fact that both countries display similar 
features of rising states as suggested by PCT - namely rising GDP per capita, rising 
military spending and increasing urbanization rates - they also have crucial differences 
such as their population structure and economic orientation. These assessments show 
that China’s rise is not thinkable without India. Including India and the EU as important 
global actors accounts for the changed power distribution especially in the past decades. 
Another broadly discussed issue with regard to ‘modernizing’ the PCT is the role of soft 
power. As noticed by many scholars such as Keohane and Nye, Tessman and Chan40 
as well as Kissane, soft power seems to play an increasingly important role - especially 
since the information revolution. Keohane and Nye observe that with the spreading 
of information technology, material hard power becomes less important but that soft 
power gains prominence41. The problem that soft power is very hard to measure is the 
reason it has not been incorporated into PCT so far. As the PCT and its predictive power 
rest on the measurement of power elements, it would require soft power to be framed in 
36  Doran (2012).
37  This view is also backed from the economic point of view. See Mueller (2009) and Dixon (2011).
38  See for example Kumar (2003) and Doran (2012).
39  Kumar (2003).
40  Tessman (2004).
41  Keohane (1998).
18 | NFG Working Paper No. 06| August 2013 
one or several measurable indicators in order to take it into account for the role-power 
alignment. As finding an appropriate measure for soft power is beyond the scope of 
this paper, it still raises the question of measurability of power elements. With regard 
to the necessity of making assumptions in order to predict a power trajectory, it still 
seems striking why all authors who have applied PCT measures in order to predict any 
countries future foreign policy role, all authors have assumed constant coefficients for 
the single power elements. A very good example why such an assumption is problematic 
is the use of coal and steel production as proxy for national income. As important as 
these sectors may have been for many powerful economies in the past, they are certainly 
no longer an appropriate proxy for national income as they include neither services nor 
financial transactions. Kissane discusses this issue at quite some length but comes to the 
conclusion to stick with coal and steel production because PCT requires data over long 
periods of time. However, as econometric analysis well allows for time-varying elements, 
most likely lead to more accurate predictions could be obtained when allowing for 
time-varying coefficients. Steel and coal production would most likely have fairly large 
coefficients in the 19th and early 20th century but lost importance towards the end of the 
20th century. The coefficients of other power elements, for example GDP per capita, very 
likely have become larger in the past decades. For China, especially military spending 
would probably be weighted much stronger in recent years compared to the beginning 
of the 20th century. As PCT calculates shares for each power element relative to the 
total power of this element in the whole system, not including time-varying effects may 
lead to over- or underestimation of a country’s power. The Chinese GDP has increased 
rapidly since the reform and opening policies in 1978, thus it should be awarded a higher 
weight than the GDP in 1900. An average from these two would underestimate the 
economic power element of China and would thus lead to understated predictions 
about the Chinese power trajectory.
Kissane’s prediction that there will be power-parity between China and the US in 201442 
and that China will overtake the US in 2015 as leading power implies, according to PCT, 
that China will declare a stronger foreign policy role while the US have passed the peak 
of their power. When also taking Doran’s assessment into account that China will face 
a slower relative power growth in the future, both nations, the US and China, will be 
facing a critical point in their power trajectory and are thus more likely to engage in war 
than in normal times. However, as the graphs in the previous chapter show, China has 
not reached that point yet as it is well below the US level of military spending and per 
capita GDP. Consideration of new aspects to include in PCT will further underline the 
argument that China is very unlikely to acquire global hegemony in the upcoming years.
42  Kissane (2008a).
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5. Further extensions to PCT
Additional to the extensions made so far, two more determinants, namely sub-national 
as well as supra-national factors, significantly influence a country’s foreign policy role 
and its power in the international system. 
As indicated in the opening chapter, PCT aims at assessing and predicting foreign policy, 
not domestic policy. However, it seems unrealistic to assume that domestic and foreign 
policy are completely detached from each other. Much rather, domestic circumstances 
are likely to influence foreign policy and with that the four power and role elements 
identified by PCT. In the case of China, the demographic development as well as the 
growing regional disparity are two factors that will most certainly among the most 
important factors influencing future Chinese politics. The argument here is that Chinese 
leaders cannot act on the international stage without taking domestic developments into 
account. Opponents to this view might argue that China is not democratically governed 
and thus the Chinese government does not need to pay attention to the people’s needs 
but may exploit the population to finance its international policies. Some others may 
argue that foreign policy is often used to trump domestic policy in the sense that foreign 
policy successes are heavily emphasized in order to divert attention from unsolved 
domestic issues. Even though this might work in the short-term, a government will 
have much trouble maintaining domestic public support despite disregarding domestic 
problems. Even if a government is not subject to electoral terms and is not dependent on 
electoral support, it is in one way or the other dependent on public support; otherwise 
public order and social unrest might result. 
The Chinese government’s legitimacy is strongly based on economic performance and 
continued economic growth. Along with that comes an implicit promise to increase 
the living standards of the broad population. Even though the Chinese government 
has achieved unprecedented results in this respect by lifting 440 million Chinese out 
of poverty43, there are still considerable and growing income inequalities between the 
coastal and landlocked areas. In order to guarantee future economic growth, the Chinese 
government also has to take into account the increasing dependency ratio. These issues 
are only two of the most prominent and pressing domestic challenges for the Chinese 
government in the upcoming future. Furthermore, there are the continuing separatist 
movements in Tibet and Xinjiang as well as challenges by inefficient state-owned 
enterprises and a corrupt bureaucracy44. This issues point to the rising threat of social 
instability within China. Shirk has identified exactly social stability as the crucial factor 
43  The Economist (Jan 28, 2012). Measured by the World Bank’s poverty line of 1$ per day.
44  Forte (2000).
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to understand Chinese policy making45. The crucial difference to democratic regimes, 
according to Shirk, is that the survival of the Chinese regime and not only an upcoming 
election depends on successful domestic policies. This in turn implies that domestic 
considerations will always have greater weight for Chinese leaders than foreign relations 
as long as it is faced with daily reports on violent protests. On the international level, this 
manifests itself in what is widely referred to as China’s grand strategy in foreign policy 
and what some call the doctrine of Deng Xiaoping: Keep a low profile and bide your 
time46. Despite the difficulty of predicting future Chinese foreign policy, Fravel points 
out that analyzing the latest report on policy suggestions for the new Chinese leadership 
under Xi Jinping shows that only about 10% of the report addressed foreign policy while 
the remainder was devoted to domestic policy issues47. 
Coping with all of the above mentioned issues -- demographics, a widening income 
inequality, ethnic riots to name only a few -- is crucial to continuous future economic 
growth and will demand quite a large amount of financial, personnel and material 
resources to be dealt with. Hence, when pursuing its international interests, the Chinese 
government cannot ignore these challenges in order not to undermine its own legitimacy 
but must much rather align its foreign interest to the domestic challenges. As an example 
one could point to a certain necessity in the balance of military to social spending. If China 
was to disproportionally increase its military spending but disregard social demands for 
education and, increasingly, for social security, the growing disparities will lead to social 
unrest. Thus, domestic policies will be the main driving force of Chinese foreign policy 
and, following from that, Chinese foreign policy will be ‘bounded’ by domestic policy. 
Hence, sub-national elements should be included to the power factors in PCT. In order 
to include such factors to PCT they are, as discussed above, subject to measurability. An 
example for such a factor would be the GINI index as measurement of national income 
inequality. The GINI index is defined between one and zero, with a value of 0 indicating 
a perfectly equal distribution and a value of 1 indicating a perfectly unequal distribution. 
As this measurement is commonly used and available for the major states, it could well 
be incorporated into the power elements entering the PCT.
The second extension to the original PCT regards international issues and each state’s 
engagement therein. Cross-border issues such as terrorism, ensuring energy supply 
and environmental issues increasingly demand states to cooperate because no state can 
solve these issues on its own. As Pawlak argues, even though the US and China cannot 
tackle these issues among the two of them, there is no solution whatsoever without 
45  Shirk (2007), p.9 ff.
46  Chen (2011).
47  Fravel (2012).
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these two states48. Hence, there exists an increasing number of issues that inherently 
demand cooperation of several states in order to reach a solution. This constraint has 
crucial implications for the realist elements in the PCT as a state can no longer merely 
pursue its own interest in a devil-may-care attitude. Instead, new interdependencies 
-- not just in economic but also in political terms -- arise in the sense that a state may 
give its consent to an international agreement or mission because it needs international 
support on another issue. Here, the “trade” of support originally familiar from inter-
party talks in a democracy is carried to the international level. As for the incorporation 
of such supra-national elements to PCT, one could for example include a measure for 
engagement in international organizations or the number of international agreements 
signed. Additionally, it might be useful to include a measure for how ‘foreign-oriented’ a 
country is. For that, one could take a similar approach as Lahneman to obtain a relative 
measure of domestic to foreign policy: He counted how often the phrase “foreign policy” 
was used in government documents to determine a country’s ascribed role. Counting, 
for instance, the occurrence of these two phrases in government documents, speeches 
and press releases and then calculating a ratio would provide such a measure. An 
alternative, if also more complicated to quantify, would be measuring whether domestic 
or foreign policy receive higher emphasis from the central government. This could also 
be determined by searching government documents for these expressions. However, 
such emphasis might be formulated indirectly which would render this measure rather 
unrepresentative and subject to politicians’ formulations. Therefore, including the first 
measure suggested here seems more practicable and is hence recommended. 
In terms of PCT elements, such a measure could be attributed to structural power as well 
as to ideational elements. If, for example, a trade agreement is signed, it may positively 
influence the state’s economic power. Hence, states that have signed more agreements 
would tend to have a higher structural power. However, one could also argue that 
by signing international agreements, for example joining the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), countries indicate that they are willing to take on responsibility 
on the international level. As they are enrolled in the decision making process within 
the institution, they will tend to have a stronger declaratory role. Depending on how 
much a state’s council is valued within the cooperation, signing such an agreement 
may also bring along a stronger ascribed role. This shows that it is fairly difficult to 
exclusively attribute the new measures into Lahneman’s four categories. But is that really 
problematic? Kissane’s argument that the factors entering PCT should be balanced in 
order to prevent overemphasizing military strength seems very reasonable. However, 
all new elements for PCT suggested here are attributed to either ideational elements 
48  Pawlak (2011).
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or to structural power such that Kissane’s worry that there might be too much of a bias 
towards military strength can be no longer sustained.
By including the sub-national and the supra-national elements to PCT, one may be better 
equipped to properly assess future power trajectories. In the case of China, domestic 
constraints such as its aging society, demographic challenges such as the excess surplus 
of males over females, ever increasing rural-urban and east-west disparities as well 
as separatist movements will contribute to the future foreign policy of the Chinese 
government. In order to minimize social unrest stemming from distribution inequality, 
the Chinese government must provide energy, water and food supply for the large share 
of the population. Disregarding certain segments or regions will backfire and lead to 
higher domestic instability. This in turn would undermine the CCP’s legitimacy and 
maybe even threaten its rule. The connection to foreign policy is most obvious in China’s 
trade relations. As it is still highly dependent on exports in order to provide employment 
for its population and to generate income from which to finance the import of new 
technology, the Chinese government cannot act freely in its negotiations with the US 
or Europe but must much rather make concessions itself in order to receive new or 
continued access to foreign markets. Thus, it cannot unilaterally push through its own 
ideas but must, as Godement argues, learn to accommodate to mutual concession 
making49. Due to these observations, it seems unlikely that a China-dominated future 
global scenario as predicted by Kissane will emerge. Lahneman’s finding of metastability 
is in so far correct as that the US and Europe will also have to accommodate to a new 
power distribution as China.
However, following from the arguments presented here is does not seem likely that 
China will unilaterally challenge the US position but will much rather have to deal with 
its domestic issues first. This conclusion can be contributed to the liberal faction of 
political scientists who argue that globalization and growing economic interdependence 
will strengthen cooperation.50 It is also in line with Chinese research which predicts that 
while power will shift towards Asian nations, existing great powers will continue to play 
a central role in global politics and will continue to be key shapers of the international 
system. Chen describes exactly this behavior when he predicts China to follow a “soft 
balancing” strategy towards the US and the international system in general.51
49  Godement (2008).
50  Noesselt (2012), also the following.
51  Chen (2005).
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6. Conclusion
Taking Lahneman’s application of Power Cycle Theory to China as a starting point, this 
paper assessed the validity of Lahneman’s findings today and discussed the extensions 
to PCT brought forward by Kissane and Doran in light of their meaning for China. All 
power elements proposed before disregard the domestic situation of a country as well 
as the international dimension. However, domestic circumstances and international 
agreements may, and most likely do, strongly influence foreign policy. Hence, this 
paper argues that sub-national and supra-national elements should be included into 
PCT. Suggestions for these measurements are given and also discussed with regard 
to their applicability. Testing these elements empirically would contribute much to the 
understanding of determinants of foreign policy and thus, the power trajectory. The 
discussion of the ‘old’ as well as the new power measures introduced here suggests 
that Lahneman’s finding that China may challenge the US global leadership by simply 
declaring a stronger foreign policy role cannot be confirmed. Hence, even though all 
actors involved must accommodate to new power distribution, the current situation 
does not appear “metastable” in Lahneman’s sense.
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